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Abstract 
 
This article analyses international negotiations over the 2011 Libyan crisis during 
the short weeks between the start of the uprising and the passage and 
implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973. We make two 
arguments: first, following Risse, we demonstrate how and when argumentation 
around the humanitarian norm of protecting civilians mattered in these debates; 
second, we show that failure on the part of the supporters of the intervention on 
humanitarian grounds to maintain consistent and genuine argumentation in 
relation to that mandate is a key factor in explaining the subsequent lack of 
agreement about collective action inside the Security Council. We conclude that 
the lesson that arguing mattered in relation to Libya has been insufficiently 
appreciated, but needs to be better understood in order to facilitate the future 
traction of the RtoP norm in international negotiations. 
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Introduction 
Contestation around humanitarian interventions flows directly from the tension between the 
legitimacy attributed to universal human rights and the deep-seated norms associated with 
sovereignty and non-aggression. The intervention in Libya in 2011 illustrates how the use of 
force, even for protection purposes, continues deeply to divide the ‘international community’. 
 
To many, the NATO-led action against the Gaddafi regime was entirely consistent with the 
‘responsibility to protect’ (RtoP) framework. Indeed, it was a ‘textbook’ case of how RtoP 
was supposed to work;1 there was almost no dispute about ‘the facts on the ground’; the 
passing of Resolution 1973 meant the intervention was consistent with UN Charter law; and 
                                                 
1 Gareth Evans, ‘Interview: The RtoP Balance Sheet after Libya’ in Thomas G. Weiss, Ramesh 
Thakur, Mary O’Connell, Aidan Hehir, Alex Bellamy, David Chandler, Rodger Shanahan, Rachel 
Gerber, Abiodun Williams and Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Challenges & 
Opportunities In Light of the Libyan Intervention (e-International Relations, http://www.e-ir.info/wp-
content/uploads/R2P.pdf, 2011), p. 40. 
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the application of force was targeted, effective and critical to saving many lives.2 In the same 
year as the intervention took place, RtoP academics viewed the action in teleological terms, 
as though the action evidenced how far the norm had travelled.3 The work of the active 
epistemic community was seen to be part of this process of socialisation.4 
 
Yet there were many dissenting voices about the intervention. Public intellectuals such as 
David Rieff announced the death of RtoP in a New York Times op-ed entitled ‘RIP: R2P’; 
influential policy advisors who had previously been aligned with RtoP said it was ‘in major 
crisis’;5 and state leaders in Africa and elsewhere questioned its appropriateness. Others 
questioned whether RtoP had in fact played any role in shaping the outcome of the Security 
Council’s deliberations.6 This last claim is just a recent version of a more long-standing 
concern that RtoP is a convenient language used by interventionist western leaders looking to 
extend their power and influence. As one critic puts it, RtoP principles are used ‘to justify the 
actions of the great powers’ and ‘dress up problems of power in ethical garb’.7 
 
We think that these positions are unsatisfactory. By reading the case in relation to the 
literature associated with argumentation and persuasion, we advance a different set of claims 
about the Libya intervention. The first is that moral argumentation played a (but not 
necessarily the decisive) role in bringing about the intervention. We argue this in the context 
of acknowledging the presence of both arguing and bargaining in the debates. The second 
claim, perhaps more important than the first, is not that RtoP failed because it is always and 
irrevocably tied to the interests of the powerful, but rather because those taking action did not 
maintain consistent argumentation in relation to RtoP. As a consequence, RtoP has weakened 
its appeal among sections of the international community – with many states openly claiming 
                                                 
2 Royal United Services Institute, ‘Accidental Heroes: Britain, France and the Libya Operation’, 
September 2011, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RUSIInterimLibyaReport.pdf, accessed 12 
September 2013, p. 1; Spencer Zifcak, ‘The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria’, 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 13: 1-35 (2012), pp. 9, 13-4. 
3 Thomas Weiss, ‘RtoP Alive and Well after Libya’, Ethics & International Affairs 25/3: 287-292 
(2011). 
4 Alex Bellamy, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm’, Ethics & 
International Affairs 25/3: 263-269 (2011). 
5 Stewart Patrick, ‘”Responsibility to Protect” in crisis’, 7 February 2012, 
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/07/responsibility-to-protect-in-crisis/, accessed 12 
September 2013. 
6 Aidan Hehir, ‘The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility 
to Protect’, International Security 38/1: 137-159 (2013). 
7 Jeremy Moses, ‘Sovereignty as Irresponsibility? A Realist Critique of the Responsibility to Protect’, 
Review of International Studies 39/1: 113-35 (2013), pp. 133-34. 
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that they feel ‘betrayed’ by the actions of NATO. In openly calling for regime change, 
political leaders in France, the UK, and the United States unwittingly served to weaken an 
already fragile consensus in relation to the international community’s obligation to take 
decisive action. We argue that this lesson has been insufficiently appreciated in the fall-out 
from Libya, but needs to be better understood in order to facilitate the future traction of the 
RtoP norm in international negotiations. 
 
What does it mean to call RtoP a ‘norm’ or ‘framework’? The story of how RtoP became a 
framework for atrocity prevention and response is one that has been told many times.8 
Following the introduction of the basic concept in the report of the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty,9 both the report of the 2004 High Level Panel on 
Threats Challenges and Change and the 2005 In Larger Freedom report of then Secretary-
General Kofi Annan affirmed RtoP and recommended that member states consider endorsing 
the principle at the 2005 World Summit on UN reform. Intense negotiations culminated in the 
General Assembly’s endorsement of key paragraphs on RtoP in the World Summit Outcome 
Document. 
 
Between 2005 and 2011, RtoP increasingly informed responses to humanitarian crises around 
the world. It was referred to in numerous Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly 
(UNGA) Resolutions,10 including a major UNGA debate in 2009 on the theme of 
implementation. At that meeting, 94 speakers representing 180 governments spoke in the 
debate and only four called for the 2005 agreement to be rolled back.11 For a significant 
                                                 
8 Alex Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (London: Polity, 
2009); Bellamy, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’; Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to 
Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 2008). Many critical works on RtoP challenge the extent to which 2001 represented a 
significant departure from state practice, reaching back to the nineteenth century; see Aidan Hehir, 
The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); and Anne Orford, ‘Lawful Authority and the Responsibility to Protect’, 
in Richard Falk, Ramesh and Vesselin Popovski (eds.), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). For two good surveys of its reception by different states, see 
Bellamy, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’ and Thomas Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012). 
9 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to 
Protect (Ottawa: IDRC, 2001). 
10 Luke Glanville, ‘The responsibility to protect beyond borders’, Human Rights Law Review 12/1: 1-
32 (2012), p. 2. 
11 Alex Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect–Five Years On’, Ethics & International Affairs 24/2: 
143-169 (2010), p. 145. 
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number of UN member states, RtoP has become the decision-making framework in which to 
deliberate – and take action – to prevent, or protect peoples at risk from, four atrocity crimes: 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 
 
Given the high moral purpose that is addressed by RtoP, it is more accurate to refer to it as a 
principled norm12 thereby distinguishing it from the general class of ‘norms’ that relate to 
behavioural regularities (although, for ease of usage, we default to ‘norm’ in the paper). How, 
then, is the norm operationalized? Ban Ki-moon’s ‘three pillar’ formulation in his 
‘implementation’ document of 2009 provides a neat parsing of it: pillar one, the responsibility 
of states to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity; pillar two, the responsibility to assist states in meeting their protection 
obligations; and pillar three, the UN Security Council’s responsibility to take ‘timely and 
decisive’ action when states are ‘manifestly failing’ to protect their populations. Permissible 
actions under this third pillar include non-coercive means such as diplomacy and 
humanitarian assistance, and coercive measures such as sanctions or, as a last resort, the use 
of force (which requires Security Council authorization). 
 
It is important to add two caveats at this juncture. First, describing RtoP as a principled norm 
is not to claim that all states agree on what RtoP means and what actions are given effect by 
it: in this respect it is no different from other norms and frameworks that deal with arms 
control/disarmament or environmental regimes designed to limit or reduce carbon emissions. 
Second, what states do agree with is that the atrocity crimes that RtoP is designed to prevent 
or limit require limitations on the power of sovereign states to commit such crimes within 
their domestic jurisdiction. 
 
Our focus in this paper is on the case of Libya with respect to the influence of the RtoP norm 
on international negotiations and decisions. Cases matter because they show how norms of 
human protection interact with, and can be contradicted by, other competing norms, including 
sovereignty, non-violence, territorial integrity and a harms-based analysis of the costs of 
intervention. When argumentation in relation to RtoP is engaged in, speakers make normative 
claims about the international humanitarian order and the responsibilities that derive from it, 
                                                 
12 A norm is a ‘shared understanding of appropriate behaviour reflecting legitimate social purpose for 
actors within a given identity’ (Melissa Labonte, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms: Strategic 
Framing and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect (London: Routledge, 2013) p. 4. 
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responsibilities that are widely understood and have received broad support in the diplomatic 
community. The first caveat above leads us to agree with the description of humanitarian 
norms as ‘quasi-causal mechanisms’13 of persuasion. The invocation of recognisable RtoP 
language does not determine a particular policy outcome, nor can we assume that because a 
humanitarian norm has been identified as part of the policy making discourse it has caused a 
policy outcome.14 Indeed, given the complex nature of the discourse and the likelihood that 
people may couch arguments in terms that invoke RtoP but may not explicitly use those 
words, nor can the absence of specific terms be taken to mean the absence of influence of the 
RtoP norm on decision making. 
 
The article is structured along the following lines. Part one delves deeper into the theoretical 
debates about arguing and bargaining in international institutions and positions our analysis 
as recognising the presence of both. Since we can presume the presence of bargaining, our 
focus is on identifying moments when arguing appears to have mattered in the negotiations. 
In part two, we show how arguing around the RtoP norm played out in response to the mass 
atrocities that were occurring in Libya. Part three shows that the moment of consensus that 
Libya was a situation requiring external intervention was short-lived: our explanation for this 
outcome is the contradictory statements offered in support of the action by those governments 
involved in implementing the mandate, and their abject failure to maintain consistency in 
relation to arguing around the RtoP norm of protecting civilians. The lesson here is that 
normative ambiguity is politically costly and, in the long run, potentially damaging for future 
attempts to mobilise a consensus in the international community to prevent or halt mass 
atrocity crimes. 
 
1. Arguing and Bargaining in International Negotiations 
There is considerable debate in the International Relations (IR) literature concerning the 
characterisation of international negotiations and deliberation. Broadly speaking, this debate 
is between constructivists emphasising the power of normative argumentation15 and 
rationalists who foreground self-interests and material interests as the explanatory logic of 
                                                 
13 Labonte, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, p. 51. 
14 Labonte, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, p. 46. 
15 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global 
Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2004). 
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international decision making.16 The former views international negotiations as driven in 
large part by collective, norm-driven, ideational goals achieved via argumentation, whereas 
the latter views them as driven by instrumental values and a logic of consequentialism. Elster, 
for example, has argued in relation to the latter that rationalist forms of behaviour value 
choices and actions that are ‘more or less efficient means to a further end’.17 This distinction 
has been further developed to acknowledge that constructivist approaches that emphasise a 
logic of appropriateness incorporate taken-for-granted norms in a way that actors may not 
consciously declare, which means that Habermasian understandings of argumentation are 
also at play.18 Thus, constructivist ideas about how international negotiations work can be 
associated with a norm-driven logic of appropriateness (doing the ‘right thing’), and can also 
include a process of genuine argumentation that seeks to change behaviour by persuading. 
Rationalist behaviour can be associated with ‘bargaining’, by which is meant a process 
whereby actors with consistent preferences try to ensure their preferences prevail by using 
promises, threats or material opportunities to induce compliance.19 While some argue the 
international arena typically lacks the conditions required to render genuine argumentation 
possible,20 others argue that there are factors in international negotiations that justify the 
application of a moral argumentation framework to them, and that both arguing and 
bargaining can be seen to be at play.21 
 
                                                 
16 Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, ‘The Promise of Institutionalist Theory’, International Security 
20/1: 39-51 (1995). 
17 Cited in Thomas Risse, “Let's Argue!” Communicative Action in World Politics’, International 
Organization 54/1: 1-39 (2000), p. 3. 
18 Risse, ‘”Let’s Argue!”’, pp. 3-6.  
19 Risse, ‘”Let’s Argue!”’, pp. 8-9. 
20 eg Shane Mulligan, ‘Questioning (the Question of) Legitimacy in IR: A Reply to Jens Steffek’, 
European Journal of International Relations 10/3: 475-484 (2004); Ronald Krebs and Patrick 
Jackson, ‘Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric’, European Journal 
of International Relations 13/1: 35-66 (2007), p. 36; Christian Grobe, ‘The Power of Words: 
Argumentative Persuasion in International Negotiations’, European Journal of International 
Relations 16/1: 5-29 (2010); Tine Hanrieder, ‘The False Promise of the Better Argument’, 
International Theory 3/3: 390-415 (2011). 
21 eg Harald Müller, ‘Arguing, Bargaining and all that: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory 
and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations’, European Journal of International 
Relations 10/3: 395-45 (2004); Risse, ‘”Let’s Argue!”’; Thomas Risse, ‘Global Governance and 
Communicative Action’, Government and Opposition 39/2: 260-287 (2004); Frank Schimmelfennig, 
‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the 
European Union’, International Organization 55/1: 47-80 (2001); Ian Johnstone, ‘Security Council 
Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument’, European Journal of International Law 14/3: 437-
480 (2003); Ian Johnstone, ‘The Security Council as Legislature’, in Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd 
(eds.), The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority (London: Routledge, 
2008). 
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In this article, we follow Risse in emphasising that arguing and bargaining ‘usually go 
together’,22 and can be better understood as sharing a continuum than as oppositional logics. 
He posits the existence of both arguing (in which actors assert claims to truth, rightness and 
sincerity, and in which actors are willing to engage in preference-change) and bargaining 
(which attempts to induce compliance with a dominant view, and in which speakers hold 
fixed preferences) in international negotiations. Arguing is oriented towards reaching 
understanding and presumes that actors are trying to convince one another by making claims 
to truth, rightness and sincerity, and that they are open to changing their beliefs in order to 
‘reach a reasoned consensus’.23 Another position on the continuum is occupied by actors 
using arguments in a strategic mode, by trying to convince others to adopt their point of view, 
but without being themselves open to changing their position. When this occurs they are 
engaged in ‘rhetorical action’, following both a logic of argumentation and a logic of 
consequentialism.24 In this mode, arguing is still important as actors ‘use arguments to 
persuade or convince others that they should change their views of the world, their normative 
beliefs, their preferences’.25 
 
In holding that arguing and bargaining are at play in international negotiations, the approach 
we are adopting is an important revision to the wave of constructivist writings on 
‘intervention’ which has generally prioritised the causal power of norms. Following Risse, we 
adopt a ‘both/and’ position in relation to norms and interests:  as Risse suggests, rather than 
asking whether a negotiation represents arguing or bargaining (especially given that it is often 
impossible to ascertain this empirically with complete certainty),26 we are better served by 
considering the ‘conditions under which arguing and reason-giving actually matter’. Risse 
specifies conditions under which argumentation is more likely to matter: when new issues 
and agendas are being set; at a time of crisis; when outcomes are unexpected; when it is clear 
that actors using traditional bargaining tools have failed to resolve a problem; when the 
voices of actors with less material resources are being heard; and when an outcome is 
negotiated in the absence of evidence of promises, threats or deals. Identifying these 
conditions does not determine that arguing was genuine (based on a genuine openness to 
                                                 
22 Risse, ‘Global Governance and Communicative Action’, p. 298. 
23 Risse, ‘”Let’s Argue!”’, p. 9. 
24 Risse, ‘”Let’s Argue!”’, p. 8, citing Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap’. 
25 Risse, ‘”Let’s Argue!”’, p. 8. 
26 Risse, ‘Global Governance and Communicative Action’, pp. 299-300. 
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changing one’s preferences) or strategic (norm-based and seeking to convince others to adopt 
one’s own preferences). It does, however, indicate that arguing has mattered. 
 
Our analysis focusses on the input into the debate of INGOs, regional organisations and 
members of the UN Security Council. In analysing the latter, we are aware that diplomats 
around the Council table in New York have only delegated authority invested in them by 
their governments, such that they will always be cautious when substantive matters are under 
discussion, with procedural issues being the area where they have individual room to 
manoeuvre.27 We acknowledge, of course, the structure of the Council that privileges 
continuity over change, due in part to the membership configuration and also because its 
work is closely tied to historic or conventional interpretations of the UN Charter and its 
functions within it. The impetus towards humanitarian intervention is a good illustration of 
the emergence of new norms inside the Council – although the idea has a long history, it only 
became acceptable for the Council to interpret humanitarian emergencies as a ‘threat to 
international peace and security’ after the end of the Cold War.28 
 
We are also aware that the structure of the Council means that the application of a framework 
devoted to examining arguing can be contested by those who view this arena (especially 
given the dominance and veto power of the permanent members (P5), combined with behind 
the scenes deal making) as eliminating the possibility for meaningful attempts at arguing or 
persuasion29 Yet a range of other factors point to the possibility of argumentation taking 
place, including that the range of possible reasons an actor can deploy is limited to the 
activation of Charter provisions and the customary law of nations (jus cogens) in relation to 
the use of force, and that the deliberations of the Council are scrutinised by the General 
Assembly and increasingly by the global media and non-government organisations. Of 
course, these factors do not automatically trump others that suggest that argumentation and 
persuasion have weak chances of being meaningful, including the often ambiguous language 
of the Council’s agreements, and the lack of authority to require compliance from member 
                                                 
27 Sydney Bailey and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 3rd edn, 1998). 
28 Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
29 eg Krebs and Jackson, ‘Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms’, p. 36; Mulligan, Questioning (the 
Question of) Legitimacy in IR’, pp. 476-7. 
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states.30 Nevertheless, we view the Council as the ‘collective legitimizer’31 for the use of 
armed force in world politics, with its legitimacy resting on the consensus within the UN that 
maintaining peace and security is its justification and purpose. Further, while some may view 
the veto power as strongly linked to material and strategic interests, others could regard it as 
providing a ‘constraint on discourse’ that could induce argumentation.32 Non-permanent 
members must make a ‘greater argumentative effort’33 to gain support for their views. The 
application of this framework of analysis to the Council is therefore justifiable.34 
 
2. Libya as an RtoP case 
Claims were made by INGOs very soon after the armed uprising against Qaddafi had begun 
that the regime was engaged in crimes against humanity.35 Within days, a consensus had built 
that action had to be taken or the situation on the ground would deteriorate. The respected 
NGO, UN Watch, on 20 February described the deliberate killings of ‘hundreds of peaceful 
protestors and innocent bystanders’ as the government ‘committing gross and systematic 
violations of the right to life’ and ‘crimes against humanity’, including ‘mass killings’, in a 
‘widespread and systematic policy’. Its statement concluded that ‘member states and high 
officials of the United Nations have a responsibility to protect the people of Libya from what 
are preventable crimes’.36 Similar assessments were made on 22 February by the International 
Crisis Group (ICG) and Civicus. The ICG’s statement called for targeted sanctions in 
accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, against Qaddafi, and a no-fly zone ‘if 
                                                 
30 Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum (eds.), The United Nations 
Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 30. 
31 Inis Claude, ‘Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations’, International 
Organization 20/3: 367-379 (1996). 
32 Following Erik Eriksen, ‘Deliberative Supranationalism in the EU’, in Erik Eriksen and John 
Fossum (eds.), Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation? (London: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 57. 
33 Risse, ‘”Let’s Argue!”’, p. 16. 
34 See Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations’; Johnstone, ‘The Security Council as Legislature’, 
Ian Johnstone, ‘Discursive Power in the UN Security Council’, Journal of International Law and 
International Relations 2/1: 73-94 (2006). 
35 According to the Rome Statute, crimes against humanity can include the following when committed 
‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population’: attacks directed against 
a civilian population; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
torture; rape/sexual slavery and sexual violence; forced disappearance; … or other inhumane 
treatment (Article 7, (i)a-k, (ii)a-h). 
36 UN Watch, ‘Urgent Appeal to World Leaders to Stop Atrocities in Libya’, 20 February 2011, 
http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2011/02/20/urgent-ngo-appeal-to-world-leaders-to-prevent-
atrocities-in-libya/, accessed 31 May 2012. 
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aircraft attacks against civilians continue’.37 Civicus used the term ‘crimes against humanity’ 
and explicitly asked the UN to invoke the ‘responsibility to protect’ to prevent unlawful 
killings.38 On 25 February the Arab NGO Network for Development and Civicus issued a 
joint statement to the UN Human Rights Council in which both explicitly asked the UN to 
invoke the responsibility to protect Libyan civilians.39 On 20 February, Human Rights Watch 
reported a death toll among protestors of at least 233 since 17 February, and urged an end to 
‘unlawful killing’ and ‘serious violations of international human rights law’.40 Two days later, 
it described the killings as ‘atrocities’ and called on the UN and Western governments to stop 
deferring to the regime and instead enforce ‘concrete consequences’ if the regime continued 
to use force.41 
 
Regional organisations were early adopters in the mobilisation process. The Organisation of 
Islamic Conference (OIC) made a statement on 22 February condemning the excessive use of 
force. Falling short of using terminology that would explicitly associate the events with the 
Rome Statute, the OIC described the situation in Libya as a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’.42 Its 
statement was widely picked up in the media including in Turkish Weekly, the Jerusalem 
Post, Malaysian Digest, PanArmenian.Net, Arab News, Asharq Alawsat, Qatar News Agency, 
and Deutsche Press-Agentur. On 23 February the African Union made similar statements 
                                                 
37 International Crisis Group, ‘Media Release: Immediate International Steps Needed to Stop 
Atrocities in Libya’, 22 February 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-
releases/2011/immediate-international-steps-needed-to-stop-atrocities-in-libya.aspx, accessed 31 May 
2012. 
38 Civicus, ‘Press Statement: Libya: UN must invoke “Responsibility to Protect” to prevent unlawful 
killings’, 22 February 2011, https://www.civicus.org/en/media-centre/press-releases/440-libya-un-
must-invoke-responsibility-to-protect-to-prevent-unlawful-killings, accessed 31 May 2012. See also 
Amnesty International, International Federation for Human Rights and Oxfam, ‘NGOs call on EU 
urgent action to stop violence in Libya’, 25 February 2011, 
http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2011-02-25/ngos-call-eu-urgent-action-stop-
violence-libya, accessed 21 August 2013. 
39 A/HRC/S-15/NGO/1, 25 February 2011. 
40 Human Rights Watch, ‘Libya – Governments Should Demand End to Unlawful Killings’, 20 
February 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/20/libya-governments-should-demand-end-
unlawful-killings, accessed 19 August 2013. 
41 Human Rights Watch, ‘Hold Gadhafi Accountable for Atrocities’, 22 February 2011, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/22/hold-gadhafi-accountable-atrocities, accessed 19 August 2013. 
42 Organisation of Islamic Conference, ‘OIC General Secretariat Condemns Strongly the Excessive 
Use of Force against Civilians in the Libyan Jamarhiriya’, 22 February 2011, http://www.oic-
oci.org/oicv2/topic/?t_id=4947&ref=2081&lan=en&x_key=libya, accessed 12 September 2013. 
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regarding the ‘indiscriminate and excessive use of force’.43 The European Union described 
the violence as excessive.44 
 
Unusually for a humanitarian crisis, the UNSC became quickly involved, issuing a statement 
on 22 February, after having been briefed by the Libyan representative who had requested a 
meeting, and the League of Arab States. The Council expressed ‘grave concern’ and 
condemned the use of violence.45 Its statement ‘called on the Government of Libya to meet its 
responsibility to protect its population’.46 Three factors had arguably contributed to this 
unusually rapid and explicit use of the language of RtoP47: the League of Arab States earlier 
the same day had suspended Libya from the League and issued a statement strongly 
condemning the violence by the Libyan regime;48 the Libyan representative had distanced 
himself from the actions of Qaddafi and his ruling elite; and lastly, the OIC had form in terms 
of previously pushing the UNSC for action on Bosnia in the 1990s.49 
 
Three days later, on 25 February the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navy Pillay, 
spoke to the Human Rights Council, bringing its attention to the use of hard military power 
against demonstrators, saying that ‘tanks, helicopters and military aircraft have reportedly 
been used indiscriminately to attack the protestors’ and suggesting those killed and injured 
numbered in the ‘thousands’.50 In her statement, she reminded the Council that at its 2005 
Summit, world leaders had ‘unanimously agreed that each individual State has a 
responsibility to protect its populations from crimes against humanity … When a State 
manifestly fails to protect its population from serious international crimes, the international 
                                                 
43 African Union, ‘Press Release: Communique of the 261st Meeting of the Peace and Security 
Council’, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 February 2011. 
44 BBC World News, ‘Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi Appears on state TV’, 22 February 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12533069, accessed 31 May 2012. 
45 SC/10180, AFR/2120, 22 February 2011; Ban Ki-Moon, ‘Secretary-General Remarks to the Press 
on Libya’, 21 February 2011, http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/?nid=1731, accessed 2 May 2012. 
46 SC/10180, AFR/2120, 22 February 2011. 
47 Zifcak describes the speed with which the UN responded as ‘almost unprecedented’. Zifcak, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria’, p. 3. 
48 Cited in League of Arab States, ‘The outcome of the Council of the League of Arab States meeting 
at the Ministerial Level in its extraordinary session on the implications of the current events in Libya 
and the Arab position’, 12 March 2011. 
49 The authors would like to acknowledge that the source of this point was one of the anonymous 
reviwers. 
50 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Statement delivered on behalf of all Special Procedures mandate 
holders of the United Nations Human Rights Council at the Fifteenth Special Session of the Human 
Rights Council on the human rights situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’, 25 February 2011. 
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community has the responsibility to step in, taking positive action in a collective, timely and 
decisive manner’.51 The figure of ‘thousands’ cited by Pillay was reported in the press.52 Also 
on 25 February, the UNSC held a debate on ‘peace and security in Africa’ which had been 
requested by the then-defected Libyan representative. At that meeting the UN Secretary 
General spoke of an estimated 1000 deaths, and threats by Qaddafi to engage in more mass 
killings. On 25 February the UNHRC adopted a resolution that stated, ‘recent and systematic 
human rights violations … may also amount to crimes against humanity’, and again called 
upon the Libyan government to ‘meet its responsibility to protect its population’.53 At a 
meeting of the Security Council the same day, the UN Secretary General reiterated the 
international community’s obligation to protect civilians, restating Pillay’s view cited 
above.54 He described the reports of INGOs and the media as ‘credible and consistent’. 
 
It is notable that during this period from 20 to 25 February, the Qaddafi regime only 
exacerbated concerns about the likelihood of ongoing violence towards civilians, describing 
anti-government protestors, especially those holding Benghazi, as ‘cockroaches’,55 ‘rats’ who 
needed to be ‘stormed’ and butchered,56 and threatening them with civil war and mass 
killings.57 
 
It was clear within only days that reports of systematic attacks on civilian populations and 
their likely increase were regarded as credible, and that regional organisations and the United 
Nations were appreciative of those facts. The beginnings of an RtoP case had been 
established. 
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The next day, on 26 February, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 
which invoked RtoP and the UN Charter, while also reaffirming a ‘strong commitment to the 
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity’ of Libya. The resolution 
appealed to different and – depending on how circumstances developed – potentially 
contradictory norms in relation to intervention and sovereignty. The resolution urged Libyan 
authorities to act with restraint, referred the situation to the International Criminal Court for 
investigation, imposed an arms embargo, enforced a travel ban on senior members of the 
regime, and froze Libyan assets. 
 
After the vote, the meeting was opened up for statements on behalf of member States. The 
UK’s representative, Sir Mark Lyall Grant made it clear that the package of sanctions agreed 
in Res. 1970 evidenced that the Council was standing by the Libyan people and in so doing, 
exercising its international responsibility to protect. The statement by India’s representative, 
Mr Hardeep Singh Puri, is germane because it notes that India is not a party to the Rome 
Statute, a status that it shared with five other Council members: nevertheless, it was 
persuaded to support Res. 1970 by the letter from the permanent representative of Libya (26 
February 2011) and ‘our colleagues from Africa and the Middle East’ who believed that an 
ICC referral would bring about a cessation of violence. The position of the Libyan delegation 
and its stated desire for a ‘courageous resolution’ shaped the justificatory statements made by 
many non-permanent members, as did the strong calls for action on the part of regional 
organisations (see, eg, statements by South Africa, Nigeria, Lebanon and China).58 
 
The states usually regarded as having more power in the Council took up stances that 
challenged previous indifference to international norms of human protection. Susan Rice, 
representing the United States, spoke strongly in favour of the adoption of ‘biting sanctions’. 
Perhaps more than any other representative, Rice dwelt on the way in which the actions of the 
Libyan leadership meant it had lost the legitimacy to rule, thus invoking a normative liberal 
conception of the state’s role in guaranteeing freedom. The Russian representative endorsed 
the consensus in relation to targeted sanctions, while noting concern about the implications of 
intervention, stating that sanctions do not entail ‘forceful intervention in Libya’s affairs’. 
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In considering the conditions under which argumentation may have mattered in achieving the 
consensus required to adopt Res. 1970, it is of note that the debate occurred over the 
relatively new agenda of implementing coercive means to protect citizens when their state is 
failing to do so. The situation on the ground had been verified by INGOs within a matter of 
days, who provided what decision makers regarded as credible and consistent evidence of 
systematic mass killings. Regional actors played an important role in supporting UN-led 
action to halt atrocity crimes. It was also true that powerful states including the UK and US 
were both in favour of taking action, and that neither China nor Russia vetoed or abstained. 
There is no public evidence of threats, promises or deals being involved in the vote (in 
contrast to the extensive bargaining undertaken by the UK and US governments in 2002 in 
relation to the Iraq war). There is evidence of the use of the explicit language of the 
responsibility to protect, as well as implicit signifiers, such as the use of Charter VII 
authority, and the description of events as atrocities and international crimes. These were 
highly likely to frame the events as an RtoP situation. However, despite the unanimous 
passage of Res. 1970, significant differences of opinion still existed in relation to the use of 
force. 
 
In the three weeks after the passage of Res. 1970, debate centred on the kind and scale of 
intervention required to protect Libyans, with the responsibility to protect competing with 
other normative claims, such as the presumption against the use of force and the reluctance to 
interfere in the domestic jurisdiction of a member state. At the same time, the violence 
continued.59 
 
Following strong statements condemning the continued violence against Libyan civilians 
issued by the League of Arab States, the African Union, the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference and the European Union, as well as a statement by the US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton to the Human Rights Council,60 on 1 March the UN General Assembly 
suspended Libya’s membership of the Human Rights Council.61 Clinton reminded the Human 
Rights Council that it was ‘founded because the international community has a responsibility 
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to protect universal rights’.62 Secretary-General Ban continued to describe reports of ongoing 
violence as ‘credible and consistent’, and called for unity among international leaders, saying 
he had spoken with US President Obama on 28 February. In a case of having it both ways, he 
declared the challenge was to provide ‘real protection’ for the Libyan people while also 
recognising that ‘change must come from within’.63 
 
Some actors remained opposed to intervention, and some who began to support intervention 
did so without demonstrating a commitment to the RtoP norm. Russia, on 2 March, affirmed 
that while they condemned the violence in Libya, ‘these problems should be addressed by the 
peoples of the relevant countries’.64 The Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
affirmed its respect for Libya’s territorial integrity.65 On 8 March the OIC described the 
events as ‘crimes against humanity’ and expressed support for a no-fly zone,66 and on 12 
March the League of Arab States urged the creation of a no-fly zone, and stated the Libyan 
government had ‘lost its sovereignty’. On 14 March the European Council made a statement 
to the UNSC arguing that ‘all necessary means’ should be used to ensure the safety of the 
people, a phrase that validates armed intervention under the UN Charter,67 and a majority of 
the G8 countries supported this position. 
 
The position of the United Sates was clearly important, as it is such a strategic player. Yet at 
the outset Defense Secretary Robert Gates was cautious and, with National Security Advisor 
Tom Donilon, questioned whether Libya was vital to US national security interests,68 thus 
positing the traditional realist objection to humanitarian intervention. In early March, Obama 
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‘showed no eagerness’ to agree to a no-fly zone69 and instead increased humanitarian relief 
and enforced an assets freeze.70 
 
Importantly the United States changed it position: a change that has been attributed to 
Obama’s personal view on the protection of civilians. At a critical meeting of his cabinet with 
18 advisors in the Situation Room on 15 March, Obama concluded that a no-fly zone would 
not actually save lives. There were initially no other strategies mapped out, because the 
advisors believed no core national security interests were at stake,71 although Obama himself 
had stated that the situation was of national security interest on 25 February72 The US was 
uneasy with the costs and risks of intervention – the logic of consequences was clearly 
playing the dominant role in the administration’s reasoning at this point. But Obama asked 
for more information and reconvened the meeting later that evening, at which he changed his 
mind on what was needed to protect lives. He decided to seek a new UN resolution that 
would authorise ‘all necessary measures’.73 In a detailed first-hand account, Obama is said to 
have invoked the US’ endorsement of an international responsibility to protect: leaving the 
people of Benghazi to their fate was just ‘not who we are’. The next day, Susan Rice made it 
known at the UN that the US President had made this decision.74 She pushed for a new 
resolution that would endorse military strikes, led by NATO.75 Rice lobbied Portugal, Brazil 
and Russia in particular, and Obama made a personal call to South African President Jacob 
Zuma,76 telling him ‘this is a personal priority’.77 Obama discussed the US’ position with 
Russian President Medvedev and France’s President Sarkozy.78 
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Momentum had been developed, and on 17 March 2011 the Council adopted Resolution 
1973, which authorised the protection of civilians using ‘all necessary measures’ and 
established a no-fly zone and ongoing arms embargo, enforced by a NATO-led coalition. The 
Resolution reiterated ‘the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan 
population’, and expressed determination from member states to ‘ensure the protection of 
civilians’, while reaffirming a commitment to Libya’s sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity. It demanded an end to violence against civilians, and that the Libyan 
government ‘take all measures to protect civilians’. 
 
Unlike Res. 1970, the vote on Res. 1973 was not unanimous. It was put forward by France, 
Lebanon, the UK and the US, with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Gabon, Nigeria and 
Portugal voting in favour. Brazil, China, India, Germany and Russia abstained. In their 
statements to the Council, both those who voted in favour of the resolution and those who 
abstained invoked the responsibility to protect civilians, thus demonstrating a broad 
consensus that this was the overriding purpose of Res. 1973. Among those who voted in 
favour, Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that ‘human lives must be protected’, Colombia and 
Portugal reiterated the need to protect civilian populations, Nigeria reminded the meeting of 
the resolution’s emphasis on the protection of civilians, South Africa declared the Council 
had acted ‘responsibly to protect and save the lives of defenceless citizens’, France reiterated 
that Res. 1970 had unsuccessfully asked Libyan authorities to enforce their responsibility to 
protect Libyan people and also said the new resolution was a means to protect civilians, 
Lebanon said the new resolution would ensure the protection of the Libyan people, the UK 
said the new resolution authorised ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians, and the US said 
the purpose of the Council was to protect innocent civilians. Among those abstaining, Russia 
stated that the League of Arab States had requested the protection of the civilian population, 
and that it was a ‘consistent and firm advocate … of the protection of the civilian population’, 
but that the draft ‘was morphing before our eyes’ into an authorisation with unclear limits on 
scope or the rules of engagement. India called on the Libyan authorities to protect its civilian 
population, arguing that they had insufficient credible information or details on enforcement 
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to approve the new resolution. Brazil noted that its abstention did not ‘disregard’ the need to 
protect civilians, but argued that the new resolution went too far, and that it was not 
convinced that the use of force would achieve the goal of protecting civilians. Germany 
expressed concern that a military intervention would result in large scale loss of life.79 Given 
the extent of the use of explicit RtoP language in the statements and justifications of key state 
and non-state based actors, it is difficult to agree with Hehir who regards Res. 1973 as having 
been ‘only tangentially related’ to R2P.80 
 
Two things are clear from this overview of the justificatory statements. First, the language 
and sentiment of the international community’s responsibility to protect civilians in the face 
of a regime’s clear intention to engage in systematic attacks on them was affirmed. Second, 
both the supporters of Res. 1973 and those who abstained emphasised the ongoing 
responsibility of both the Libyan authorities and the international community to protect 
civilians, while having differences of opinion as to how best this could be carried out and 
what a military intervention might mean for the achievement of this goal. This demonstrates 
that the RtoP norm was present explicitly and implicitly in the reasoning of Council 
members. 
 
To return to Risse’s identification of moments where argumentation may have mattered, it 
can plausibly be argued that this happened in three respects. First, key members of the 
Council decided not to utilise their veto power – an outcome that has been described as 
‘surprising’.81 Russia and China, two of the permanent members, engaged in constructive 
acquiescence – acceding to Res. 1973 by not vetoing it, reflecting the long-standing 
aspiration within the RtoP community that the right of veto be inadmissible in the context of 
a supreme humanitarian emergency. For Russia this occurred in the context of continuing to 
raise the question of how best civilians could be protected. For China this represented a 
change of position from earlier reports they were likely to block such a move.82 While there 
were undoubtedly other factors at play in their decision-making, they chose to couch their 
reasoning in terminology that reflected the mandate of RtoP. Further, traditional tools, such 
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as the sanctions and other measures introduced in Res. 1970 were proving inadequate at 
achieving the goals being sought – the primary one being the protection of civilians, since 
other norms including territorial integrity and sovereignty were not called into question by 
Res. 1970. Indeed the ‘failure’ of Res. 1970 was that it did not deter the regime from 
engaging in further massacres, which then became the rationale for a new resolution.  
 
Second, evidence that arguing mattered can also be seen from the fact that during this intense 
period in international diplomacy the voices of weaker actors were being heard. The voting 
preferences of the African members on the Security Council were critical to the Resolution 
being passed despite the fact that the African Union did not want external coercive 
intervention, a position that itself rested on widely understood norms of peaceful dispute 
settlement among fellow African countries. Had two of the three African countries voted 
against Res.1973, it would have failed to garner the necessary number of affirmative votes 
(nine). 
 
Third, it can be reasonably claimed that arguing mattered in relation to the role of regional 
organisations in lending support to a no-fly zone. Statements by regional actors such as the 
Arab League were not couched in RtoP language and were almost certainly motivated by 
strategic motivations and regional politics;83 at the same time, the resolution passed by the 
League was mobilised strategically and integrated into the debate by supporters of RtoP to 
lend weight to the arguments that the protection of civilians was a valid ground for 
intervention. 
 
The evidence is not incontrovertible. We of course do not know about deals or promises 
made behind the scenes – and it will be many years before classified documents relating to 
decision-making on the crisis are released for public scrutiny. But it is possible to say that 
there are reliable indicators of the presence of moral argumentation making a difference in 
convincing many elected Security Council members to vote in favour, and the ‘P2’ to refrain 
from using their veto. In this respect, it is possible to read their abstentions as constructive 
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acquiescence – after all it must have been self-evident that an abstention would likely enable 
the resolution to be passed. 
 
3. After Res. 1973: norm inconsistency 
The unanimity achieved on 26 February, and the consensus that Libya was an RtoP situation, 
came to an abrupt halt within days of Operation Odyssey Dawn commencing. Only a few 
days later South African President Jacob Zuma condemned the air strikes and called for a 
ceasefire. The South African government then claimed to support both the Security Council’s 
pro-intervention position and the African Union’s anti-intervention position.84 India, which 
had abstained, moved quickly to condemn the air strikes, on the basis not of their potential 
impact on civilians, but on the basis of an entirely different norm, since on 22 March it 
described the situation in Libya as an ‘internal’ matter,85 thus rejecting a central premise of 
RtoP. On 14 April, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa issued the ‘Sanya 
Declaration’ which inter alia stated that the Libyan situation should be resolved peacefully, 
and expressed support for an African Union High-Level Panel Initiative on Libya that also 
sought that outcome.86 
 
In contrast, Brazil also condemned the air strikes, but on the basis that they were risking the 
protection of civilians mandate that had authorised the Resolution.87 The African Union on 25 
May stated that NATO-led operations were defeating the purpose for which they were 
authorised, namely the protection of the civilian population.88 The Secretary-General of the 
League of Arab States, Amr Moussa, expressed similar concerns, saying ‘what is happening 
in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone … what we want is the protection of 
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civilians and not the shelling of more civilians.89 These comments were perhaps disingenuous 
– it had been clear to all players that once Res. 1973 was authorised, force would be used 
against the regime. Indeed, this was likely one reason for the abstentions,90 and the 
requirement to protect civilians had limited the scope of the military intervention.91 
 
Russia went further, with Prime Minister Putin declaring that the NATO-led action showed 
that the resolution ‘allows everything. It resembles medieval calls for crusades’.92 He 
therefore suggested openly that the implementation of the resolution was not aimed at 
protecting civilians, but rather had altogether different motives. 
 
This suggestion – that the basis for Res. 1973 was not RtoP, but rather the achievement of 
other norms – was facilitated and buttressed by the failure of the supporters of Res. 1973 to 
maintain argumentation around RtoP on the basis of the RtoP norm in the period after 
intervention began. When questions were raised about the risk that bombing Qaddafi’s 
compound in Tripoli posed to civilians, UK Defence Secretary Liam Fox intimated that the 
assassination of the Libyan leader was ‘potentially a possibility’. He was quickly corrected by 
the Chief of Defence Forces Sir David Richards, but the damage had been done.93 On 29 
March the US, UK and France released a joint statement in which they restated that the 
purpose of military intervention was to protect civilians, but simultaneously declared that it 
was ‘impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Qaddafi in it’ and that the ‘pathway to 
peace’ in Libya required that ‘Qaddafi must go and go for good’.94 This open discussion of 
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regime change, in contradistinction to an earlier emphasis by the US on the humanitarian 
mandate to protect civilians,95 combined with an operation that took place ‘at the very edge of 
what the resolution authorised’,96 had a significant impact in increasing opposition by China 
and Russia to the intervention in Libya.97 
 
By the time of an important UN General Assembly open debate on the protection of civilians 
in November 2011 it became evident that the contestation over Libya was more than a fall-
out between the permanent members of the Security Council. The statement by the South 
African Ambassador to the UN, Baso Sangqu, illustrates the depth of the dispute among 
prominent UN member states: 
South Africa has registered its concerns publicly with the manner in which efforts 
employed by the Security Council to protect civilians have been exploited in the 
recent past. In particular, my delegation has expressed its condemnation of recent 
NATO activities in Libya which went far beyond the letter and spirit of resolution 
1973 adopted by this Council. Abusing the authorization granted by this Council to 
advance political and regime change agenda’s [sic] does not bode well for future 
action by this Council in advancing the protecting of civilians agenda. This could lead 
to a permanent state of paralysis within this Council in addressing similar situations in 
future. 
The fact that these words were being spoken by a representative of a country that attaches 
considerable priority to the causes of human rights and social justice shows just how deep the 
rift has become. 
 
Conclusion: Arguing matters 
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This article has challenged the view by Hehir98 that RtoP played no causal role in the Libya 
action. We have shown both that the arguing in relation to the norm of RtoP played a 
significant role in the public debate that occurred up to the passage of Res. 1970 and Res. 
1973 and that significant elements of Risse’s conditions for moments when arguing matters 
were met. Even if this argumentation was used to hide other unspecified reasons for the use 
of force, it is still the case that once deployed into the public sphere it mattered. The evidence 
presented here is insufficient to determine whether RtoP was deployed in the form of 
strategic argumentation or genuine argumentation. The logic of consequences, while also 
present, did not play the only role in reasoned decision-making over Libya. RtoP provided 
legitimacy for Operation Odyssey Dawn – and passing a UNSC resolution was a critical 
component of this legitimation. 
 
Our second finding is that, crucially, there was a failure on the part of the supporters of RtoP 
to provide appropriate and consistent support for their action once the intervention started. 
This finding is important: the abject failure of the supporters of RtoP to maintain consistent 
argumentation  after the military intervention had commenced was a fundamental mistake 
that provided RtoP sceptics with a ready-made script about Western states’ insincerity: for 
critics, regime change was intended from the outset. 
 
We have seen the implications of this failure in other international negotiations over 
humanitarian norms. During April 2011, just weeks after Res. 1973 was passed, the UK, 
USA and France sought to pass a resolution in the Council condemning Assad’s violence 
against civilians, protestors and supporters of the Syrian National Council. Russia argued that 
the draft resolution represented interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, 
although the starting point for RtoP is that sovereignty does not provide a legal basis or moral 
defence for committing atrocity crimes. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine 
debates in the UNSC in relation to Syria, but our argument suggests that it was not just the 
fact of the shift from RtoP to regime change in Libya that has led to Russia’s position on the 
Syrian conflict, but the fact that the argumentation after the passage of Res. 1973 became 
inconsistent, confused, and no longer was centred on the goal of civilian protection. Had 
supporters of RtoP grasped how and when arguing matters, they may have devoted greater 
attention to the need to reaffirm the normative legitimacy of the mandate to ensure trust and 
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sincerity, although hard to achieve, did not fragment so easily or quickly. Actors who wish 
humanitarian norms to prevail in international negotiations in future should take account of 
these lessons in considering how and when they put forward their points of view, and under 
what circumstances they are more (and not less) likely to succeed. Sustaining a norm as 
fragile as using force in response to mass atrocities, while clearly attainable, is a difficult 
objective. The norm requires constant nurturing through argumentation if it is to prevail in 
the international arena. 
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